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Introduction
This paper examines the demand for auditing in the initial public offerings (IPO) market where informational asymmetries abound. Because these asymmetries create a demand for information to help establish equity values and for market signaling to mitigate adverse selection, IPOs offer a natural setting for studying the importance of auditing. Consistent with Dye's [1993] dual characterization of the audit as both enhancing resource allocation (an informational role) and providing investors with a claim on the auditor in the event of an audit failure (an insurance role), I test the demand for auditing arising from both informational signaling and insurance signaling. The results support both roles for auditing, though the evidence in support of an insurance signaling role seems particularly strong.
I study the demand for auditing from the combined perspectives of investors (auditors and IPO underpricing), entrepreneurs (IPO auditor
IPOs and the ResponsibilitieslRoles of the Auditor
The auditor's primary responsibility in an IPO is to express an opinion on the financial statements. In addition, the auditor should read the registration statement to determine whether it is consistent with the financial statements and to ensure that all material facts that could affect a potential investor are properly disclosed; however, "the textual portions of the registration statement are the responsibility of the registrant and its general counsel, not the independent accountant" (Herz et al. [1997] , p. 63). Dye [1993] models the audit as composed of informational and liability components and shows the conditions under which an auditor's wealth is a bond for audit quality. The informational role relies on audit quality differences, whereas a liability role relies on differences in quasiinsurance coverage provided in the event of securities litigation.
It is widely perceived that larger, more prestigious firms have greater incentives not to perform a low-quality audit at a high-quality price (DeAngelo [1981] ). Research on auditors and IPOs builds from this assertion that certain auditors supply higher-quality engagements, thereby providing entrepreneurs with a way to reveal favorable information. For example, Titman and Trueman [1986] model a more costly, higher-qual-ity auditor who provides more precise information about the firm's final cash flow, a signal that an entrepreneur with less favorable information cannot profitably mimic. Datar, Feltham, and Hughes [1991] also consider a quality-based rationale for the auditor which, in conjunction with ownership retention, serves as a joint signal of private information about the firm's future value. While these models and their predictions differ, a cornerstone of both is the assumption of a quality differential among auditors; this differential gives rise to an informational signal, the revelation of entrepreneurial private information about firm value.1
Larger, prestigious audit firms are also perceived to provide increased coverage in the event of securities litigation; the auditor is seen as providing financial statement users with a form of insurance (e.g., Arthur Andersen et al. [1992] ). Empirical findings concerning the relation between auditor size and IPO underpricing seem consistent with the market valuation of a litigation put where "one might expect . .. that investors would be willing to pay more for the stock because of the availability of a potential recovery under the securities laws" (Alexander [1994 (Alexander [ , p. 1441 Titman and Trueman [1986] as he asserts that prestigious auditors attest to more precise accounting reports which will "allow uninformed investors to estimate more precisely the distribution of firm value" (Beatty [1989, p. 696] ). Hogan [1997] builds on Beatty's argument that the benefit of a more costly, higher-quality auditor is reduced IPO underpricing. She analyzes this trade-off as a form of self-selection analysis and provides support for the notion that entrepreneurs, cognizant of this marginal benefit/marginal cost calculus, choose auditor type to minimize the combined costs of the audit fee and underpricing.
2 Identifying DSEs as a setting where audit quality should not matter averts the problem that audit quality, the probability that an auditor will identify and report the existence of a material financial misstatement, becomes observable only after the audit, if the auditor is sued. 
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A of table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the auditors associated with 1993-94 IPOs grouped by size. The small-deal segment is defined, per the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) cutoff for filing a Form SB-1,3 as IPOs raising $10 million or less. Auditor variation concentrates among small deals; the Big Six share is 84% of the overall market and 59% of the small-deal segment. The remainder of companies 3The SEC instituted S-18 filings in 1979 to provide small companies (i.e., those raising less than $7.5 million) with a less burdensome registration requirement. S-18 filings have since been replaced by SB-1 filings, appropriate for small business issuers which raise less than $10 million. that go public by raising $10 million or less are audited by the second tier, with an 11% share, and by nonnationals, with a 30% share.4
Panel B of table 1 presents descriptive statistics partitioned by DSE status and auditor type. To avoid exchange effects (Schultz [1993] ), I focus on those small-deal IPO issuers that went public on the NASDAQ (280 small IPOs minus 10 AMEX and regional-exchange listed offerings). Per panel B, small-deal DSE IPOs have median assets of just $864,000, none of them audit-intensive inventories or receivables. DSEs also have fewer subsidiaries and less international presence, relative to more established companies going public in small IPOs. A typical small-deal IPO by a DSE also reports minimal revenues and large losses, with median sales of $13,000 and losses of $748,000, compared with $5.4 million and $107,000 in sales and profits for small-deal, non-DSEs, respectively (not reported in table 1). Finally, development stage issuers are more likely to have goingconcern audit opinions than non-DSEs. These descriptive statistics support the view that DSE IPOs provide a setting where a higher-quality auditor is less able to provide more precise information about firm value and where the risk of failure is likely higher.
Auditors and IPO Underpricing

EXOGENOUS AUDITOR CHOICE (OLS ESTIMATES)
Prior research (e.g., Balvers, McDonald, and Miller [1988] and Beatty [1989] ) documents an inverse relation between auditor size and underpricing that, consistent with an information signaling role, is attributed to quality differences among auditors. However, this finding could also be consistent with an insurance role as investors price-protect against the absence of a deep-pocketed auditor defendant. To disentangle the informational role from the insurance role, I specify auditor intercept variables that depend on the size of the IPO in an underpricing regression separately estimated for the DSE and non-DSE subsamples. As the proceeds increase, the amount at risk in a potential securities suit rises and the failure to retain a deep-pocketed auditor should be associated with greater underpricing.
Ln(Underpricing) = P + 1P %Retained + P2LowIB + I3Unit + P41/Price + 5E(Nonnational) + f36UE(Nonnational) + c, The dependent variable is logarithmically transformed to mitigate distributional problems5 and market adjusted by subtracting the return on the OTC Industrial Market Index. Panel A of table 2 presents the results of this underpricing regression.6 Across both DSE and non-DSE subsamples, the OLS coefficients for E(Nonnational) are insignificant (t-statistics less 5 These problems are the leptokurtosis exhibited by daily stock returns in general and the right-tailed skewness exhibited by IPO underpricing in particular. 6 The results in panel A of table 2 are consistent with the IPO literature, except that the coefficient for %Retained is positive and significant for non-DSEs. One possible explanation for this result, which is robust to consideration of influential values, stems from the nature of the small-deal sample. A major reason that small-deal IPOs represent the relevant range for study of the auditor/IPO relation is the fact that the choice of auditor is less encumbered by the influences of prestige underwriters, which ensures that an auditor choice decision does exist. However, a peculiarity of the sample is that not only are the high-reputation banks largely absent, but many underwriters arguably possess no reputation. Two-thirds of these small IPOs are taken public by banks with either a Carter, Dark, and Singh [1994] ranking of zero or no ranking at all. To pursue this, I ran the equation (1) regression for subsamples of the data partitioned on whether the underwriter had a nonzero ranking from Carter, Dark, and Singh. For the 90 IPOs underwritten by banks with a positive ranking, the coefficient on %Retained is negative, though insignificant (a t-statistic less than 1.0); whereas for the remaining 180 IPOs the coefficient on %Retained is positive and significant (t-statistic of 2.81). The coefficient for UE(Nonnational) for the non-DSE sample is positive (t = 3.25, significant at the 0.01 level) and reflects the percentage impact on underpricing of choosing a nonnational auditor for a greater than median-sized small deal by an established company. In this non-DSE setting, where company activities (e.g., generating revenues or maintaining inventories) have progressed beyond the start-up phase, higher audit quality may assist uninformed investors in inferring entrepreneurial private information. However (as with DSEs), this relation between underpricing and auditor type emerges in the larger portion of the small-deal market, and therefore is consistent with an insurance role.
ENDOGENOUS AUDITOR CHOICE (2SLS ESTIMATES)
The auditor choice decision precedes the IPO decision and the observed relation between auditor type and underpricing. To consider the sequential nature of these auditor choice/going-public decisions, I reestimate equation (1) using two-stage least squares. In the first stage, I use a bivariate probit auditor choice regression to instrument the E(Nonnational) and UE(Nonnational) variables for the second-stage underpricing regression . (Hausman [1978] ). To do this, I first estimate equation (2) in order to develop an instrumental variable for whether an IPO is audited by a nonnational firm, regardless of whether this choice is expected. Then, I add the fitted value from this bivariate probit regression to an underpricing regression which contains a zero-one variable for the presence of a nonnational firm; the results indicate that this fitted value is not statistically significant (t-statistics less than 1.0). Thus I do not reject the hypothesis that the choice of a nonnational auditor is exogenous. Panel B of table 2 presents the results of the small IPO auditor choice regression, for both DSEs and established companies.8 I specify the second-stage instrument for E(Nonnational) as equal to one if a nonnational auditor is associated with the IPO and this association is predicted with probability greater than 0.5 by the first-stage probit. Conversely, the second-stage instrument for UE(Nonnational) equals one if a nonnational auditor is associated with the IPO but this association is not predicted with probability greater than 0.5. For the DSE partition, Proceeds is not inversely related to small-IPO auditor choice; as such, the resulting UE(Nonnational) variable does not capture (as does the OLS regression) the unexpected association of a nonnational auditor with a larger IPO. In contrast, for the non-DSE partition, the first-stage probit does instrument UE(Nonnational) for the unexpected association between a nonnational auditor and a larger IPO.
I also use equation (2) to test whether the choice of a nonnational auditor in equation (1) is endogenous
As indicated in panel A of table 2, this two-stage least squares instrumental variables estimation generally confirms the OLS results. For both DSE and non-DSE samples, the 2SLS coefficient for E(Nonnational) is not associated with underpricing (t-statistics less than 1.0), whereas for UE(Nonnational) the association is significant beyond the 0.10 level (onetailed) for DSEs and the 0.05 level (one-tailed) for non-DSEs.
These findings confirm that IPOs with nonnational auditors sustain higher underpricing; the results of the DSE regression support an insurance role for auditing in IPOs. However, the results for non-DSEs support both an insurance and an informational role for auditing, though the positive coefficient for the UE(Nonnational) variable is compatible with an insurance role. These findings are consistent with the view that using a nonnational audit firm provides investors with a lower (potential) level of recovery, and investors respond by underpricing to protect themselves against the absence of a deep-pocketed defendant. The extent of this effect rationally increases with the amount of money being raised (since, per the Securities Act of 1933, the proceeds raised set an upper limit on damages).
IPOs and Auditor Compensation
The existence of an information signaling demand for auditing implies that a higher-quality audit should command a price premium. Alternatively, an insurance-based demand for auditing implies the audit fee should contain an implicit insurance premium. As the IPO proceeds increase, the auditor should be compensated for the additional insurance coverage he is providing. I reexamine the auditor/IPO relation from the standpoint of the audit firm via the following OLS regression, estimated separately for DSEs and non-DSEs: Table 3 presents the results with and without the Ln(Proceeds) variable, to demonstrate the importance of deal size after controlling for Ln(Assets) (a proxy for audit effort) and Big6 (a proxy for the fee premium to higher-quality auditors). The Big6 variable is insignificant (t < 0.50) among DSEs, whereas in the established company setting these larger firms earn fee premiums. This seems consistent with an information signaling role in which the auditor is compensated for providing a higher-quality audit in a setting (non-DSEs) where there is a reason for differential audit quality. Consistent with an insurance role, Ln(Proceeds) is positive for both DSEs and non-DSEs (t-statistics of 2.87 and 5.01, respectively). For non-DSEs, the inclusion of Ln(Proceeds) affects the significance of Big6 but not Ln(Assets). This supports the conjecture that auditors price the insurance coverage they provide and, in this established-company setting where audit effort is more important, that compensation for the insurance role is not collinear with the underlying audit work. As noted, aside from the requirement that they ascertain whether the registration statement is consistent with the financial statements, auditors are not responsible for the Use of Proceeds section (or any other textual sections) of the prospectus; therefore Ln(Proceeds) is likely not a proxy for audit effort.
These results extend Beatty [1993] by including IPO proceeds as an ex ante measure of the insurance coverage provided by the auditor. Beatty 
Summary
This paper revisits the relation between auditors and initial public offerings by examining the informational signaling and insurance signaling roles for the independent audit. I focus on small-deal IPOs, partitioned by whether the issuer is classified, per SFAS No. % as a development stage enterprise. In such enterprises, I argue, the insurance demand for auditing is likely to dominate any information-based demand. My results suggest the importance of an insurance-based demand for IPO audits; even in the small-deal segment of the IPO market, transaction size helps explain the relation between auditor choice and underpricing and is an important determinant of auditor compensation for both start-up and established companies.
